# AFF AT: Bilateral CP

### Perm: Do CP – 2AC

#### Perm: do counterplan

#### “With” only requires association, not participation

Merriam-Webster.com Dictionary, No Date, “With,” <https://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/with> /GoGreen!

Definition of with

1 a: in opposition to : AGAINST

had a fight with his brother

b: so as to be separated or detached from

broke with her family

2 a—used as a function word to indicate a participant in an action, transaction, or arrangement

works with his father

a talk with a friend

got into an accident with the car

b—used as a function word to indicate the object of attention, behavior, or feeling

get tough with him

angry with her

c: in respect to : so far as concerns

on friendly terms with all nations

#### “NATO” refers to member countries – the “North Atlantic Council” is the institution

Masters 22 Jonathan Masters, Deputy Managing Editor, Council on Foreign Relations, MA social theory, the New School, BA political science, Emory University, “What Is NATO?” Council on Foreign Relations Backgrounder, last updated 5-4-2022, <https://www.cfr.org/backgrounder/what-nato> /GoGreen!

Established during the Cold War, NATO is a transatlantic security alliance composed of thirty member countries, including the United States.

NATO has focused on deterring Russian aggression in recent years, but it has also conducted security operations in Afghanistan, Iraq, Kosovo, and Somalia.

Amid Russia’s 2022 offensive in Ukraine, many NATO allies are providing Kyiv with extraordinary quantities of military supplies, and the alliance could expand to include Finland and Sweden.

Introduction

Founded in 1949 as a bulwark against Soviet aggression, the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) remains the pillar of U.S.-Europe military cooperation. An expanding bloc of NATO allies has taken on a broad range of missions since the close of the Cold War, many well beyond the Euro-Atlantic region, in countries such as Afghanistan and Libya.

Russia’s unprovoked invasion of Ukraine, a nonmember, in early 2022 has shaken Europe’s security architecture and prompted a major reevaluation of NATO members’ foreign policies and defense commitments. The threat from Russia has generated the greatest tensions with the alliance in the post-Cold War era. It is driving up defense spending and pushing some longtime NATO partners, namely Finland and Sweden, to seek formal membership, which would mark another historic expansion of the alliance.

A Post–Cold War Pivot

After the demise of the Soviet Union in 1991, Western leaders intensely debated the direction of the transatlantic alliance. Some in the Bill Clinton administration initially opposed expanding NATO, wary it would upset relations with President Boris Yeltsin’s fragile government in Russia and complicate other U.S. foreign policy objectives, such as nuclear arms control. Others favored expansion as a way to extend NATO’s security umbrella to the east and consolidate democratic gains in the former Soviet bloc.

European members were also split on the issue. The United Kingdom feared NATO’s expansion would dilute the alliance, while France believed it would give NATO (and the United States) too much influence. Paris hoped to integrate former Soviet states via European institutions.

As a first step, Clinton chose to develop a new NATO initiative called the Partnership for Peace (PfP), which would be open to all former Warsaw Pact members, as well as non-European countries. Seeing this nonmembership framework as a means to allay some of Russia’s concerns about alliance expansion, NATO launched PfP at its annual summit in 1994. More than two dozen countries, including Georgia, Russia, and Ukraine, joined in the following months.

However, Clinton soon began speaking publicly [PDF] about expanding NATO’s membership, saying in the Czech Republic just days after the launch of PfP that “the question is no longer whether NATO will take on new members but when and how.” Yeltsin warned Western leaders at a conference later that year that “Europe, even before it has managed to shrug off the legacy of the Cold War, is risking encumbering itself with a cold peace.”

Beyond Collective Defense

Many U.S. officials felt that a post–Cold War vision for NATO needed to look beyond its core defense commitments—Article V of the North Atlantic Treaty states that “an armed attack against one or more [member states] in Europe or North America shall be considered an attack against them all”—and focus on confronting challenges outside its membership. “The common denominator of all the new security problems in Europe is that they all lie beyond NATO’s current borders,” said influential U.S. Senator Richard Lugar in a 1993 speech.

The breakup of Yugoslavia in the early 1990s and the onset of ethnic conflict tested the alliance on this point almost immediately. What began as a mission to impose a UN-sanctioned no-fly zone over Bosnia and Herzegovina evolved into a bombing campaign on Bosnian Serb forces that many military analysts say was essential to ending the conflict. In April 1994, during Operation Deny Flight, NATO conducted its first combat operations in its forty-year history, shooting down four Bosnian Serb aircraft.

NATO's Structure

Headquartered in Brussels, NATO is a consensus-based alliance in which decisions must be unanimous. However, individual states or subgroups of allies can initiate action outside NATO’s auspices. For instance, the United States, France, and the United Kingdom began policing a UN-sanctioned no-fly zone in Libya in early 2011 and, within days, transferred command of the operation to NATO once Turkey’s concerns had been allayed. Member states are not required to participate in every NATO operation; Germany and Poland declined to contribute directly to the campaign in Libya.

NATO’s military structure comprises two strategic commands: the Supreme Headquarters Allied Powers Europe, located near Mons, Belgium, and the Allied Command Transformation, located in Norfolk, Virginia. The supreme allied commander Europe oversees all NATO military operations and is always a U.S. flag or general officer; U.S. Air Force General Tod D. Wolters currently holds this position. Although the alliance has an integrated command, most forces remain under their respective national authorities until NATO operations commence.

NATO’s secretary-general, Norwegian politician Jens Stoltenberg, is serving a second four-year term as the bloc’s chief administrator and international envoy. However, NATO leaders extended his service for one additional year (until September 2023) amid the war in Ukraine. The alliance’s principal political body is the North Atlantic Council, which is composed of high-level delegates from each member state.

### Perm: Do CP – 1AR

#### It’s a group of countries

Jacobson 12 Alice Jacobson, member of Task Force 2012, The Henry M. Jackson School of International Studies, University of Washington, “Human Rights Watch & the Arab Spring,” Chapter 13.3, *Can NATO React to the Arab Spring? Democracy, Human Rights, & the Rule of Law*, 2-27-2012, <https://digital.lib.washington.edu/researchworks/bitstream/handle/1773/19668/J+Jones+Task+Force+Final+Report.pdf?sequence=1> /GoGreen!

Human rights violations as outlined in broad terms in the 2011 World Report, and pressure from organizations such as Human Rights Watch most certainly add to the international pressure on NATO to intervene. This has led to the discovery that military power may not be a useful instrument in dealing with specific country by country issues in the region. NATO is a group of democratic countries who in turn each have an individual agenda when dealing in the Middle East and North Africa, and are tied to the region by their oil dependency; but protection of human rights as justification for military intervention must be across the board or not at all. Military intervention in Libya was completed swiftly based largely on the economic incentives of NATO’s democratic powers, whereas in Syria, NATO has been immobilized as more people die everyday.

#### Contextual use proves

Alanis 22 Kaitlyn Alanis, McClatchy National Real-Time Reporter, graduate in journalism and agricultural communications, Kansas State University, “What is NATO, and what role will it play in Russia’s attack on Ukraine? 5 facts to know,” Miami Herald, 2-25-2022, <https://www.miamiherald.com/news/nation-world/article258743163.html> /GoGreen!

WHAT IS NATO?

NATO is a group of 30 member countries that agree to work together to ensure the security of the Northern Atlantic area.

“NATO’s purpose is to guarantee the freedom and security of its members through political and military means,” according to its website. Politically, the alliance promotes democracy, and it allows its members to “consult and cooperate on defence and security-related issues to solve problems, build trust and, in the long run, prevent conflict.”

### Perm: Do Both – 2AC

#### Perm: do both – plan’s just an offer, choice shields the net benefit

#### Counterplan alone does NOT spill-up – it collapses NATO – perm solves

--MDC = multinational defense cooperation

Németh 14 Bence Németh, Teaching fellow in the Defence Studies Department, King's College London, “Why won't Europeans use NATO and the EU?” Friends of Europe, 3-19-2014, <https://www.friendsofeurope.org/insights/why-wont-europeans-use-nato-and-the-eu/> /GoGreen!

Although regional MDCs have been proliferating and strengthening in Europe, they remain fragile and this fragility will have a significant impact on the landscape of European defence. The weakness of regional MDCs is that they are driven mostly by national Ministries of Defence and do not have a well-grounded, strategically sophisticated background for collaboration. Countries often co-operate on defence issues without defining their common foreign policy goals. This can undermine the raison d’être of defence cooperation, even in the short-term, and cause significant problems in situations where participating states of regional MDCs are divided on the necessity of military action.

Another difficulty for sub-regional MDCs is that although they face financial pressure to find multinational partners to mitigate the capability decline of European armed forces, they cannot develop these collaborations without significant political and social support. These problems of regional MDCs may have a negative impact on defence co-operation in NATO and the EU as well, because Ministries of Defence will be even less inclined to work together in large organisations if they cannot even succeed in smaller frameworks. However, if these difficulties can be overcome by certain regional MDCs, the participating states will have to bring their foreign policy goals closer to underpin their co-operation. Accordingly, emerging regional blocs may become more assertive in achieving their goals, and thus regional solidarity could replace transatlantic or pan-European solidarity in more and more cases. This may undermine the relevance of NATO and the EU, and result in a much weaker EU.

To avoid these outcomes, NATO and the EU have to pay more attention to the regional MDCs and must attempt to channel the results of regional MDCs into their processes as much as possible. NATO has a comparative advantage in this regard, as it possesses a much more sophisticated and effective defence planning system (NATO Defence Planning Process – NDPP) than the EU. The NDPP is not perfect, but it provides a flexible enough instrument to tackle multinational military collaborations as it has already done with multinational projects in the framework of the Smart Defence initiative.

NATO should therefore, via its NDPP, support and embed the projects of regional MDCs into its own processes and ensure that MDCs work to fulfil NATO commitments and contribute to the Level of Ambition of the Alliance. This way NATO could mitigate the chance of the development of regional interests in Europe and at the same time provide political impetus for regional MDCs to overcome the hardships of day-to-day practical collaboration.

For the last several years NATO and the EU have tried to push together countries ‘artificially’ to make them co-operate on certain capability areas. Yet, European nations created and reenergised regional MDCs. Thus, NATO should look to its other options and rather follow the ‘organic’ evolution of European military collaborations and channel that into its defence planning process.

### Perm: Do Both – 1AR

#### CP alone trades off with NATO – whether it solves or not

--MDC = multinational defense cooperation

Németh 14 Bence Németh, Teaching fellow in the Defence Studies Department, King's College London, “Why won't Europeans use NATO and the EU?” Friends of Europe, 3-19-2014, <https://www.friendsofeurope.org/insights/why-wont-europeans-use-nato-and-the-eu/> /GoGreen!

Instead of using NATO and EU institutional frameworks, European nations have recently established a series of new regional ‘multinational defence co-operations’ (MDCs) and reenergised old ones. Although policymakers and analysts support all kinds of defence co-operation, they have not taken into consideration the negative consequences of unstructured defence collaborations. For instance, if the emerging regional MDCs do not prove successful, they will hinder defence co-operation in Europe in general, including within NATO and the EU, as nations become even less willing to work with larger organisations where co-operation is slower and more complicated.

However, if these MDCs succeed, they are likely to create common views and interests among regional partners on defence issues, thereby strengthening regional bodies and weakening transatlantic ties and pan-European solidarity. Thus, NATO and the EU should revise their policies which attempt to foster defence co-operation based exclusively on common military capability requirements, and should instead focus on exploiting the changing European defence co-operation landscape by channelling regional MDCs into their planning systems.

#### Perception of using bilats to circumvent NATO snowballs

Tylaz 22 Tylaz, Professional News Platform, “Why does Russia not simply invade Ukraine and need to build a pretext?” Tylaz, 2-18-2022, <https://www.tylaz.net/2022/02/18/why-does-russia-not-simply-invade-ukraine-and-need-to-build-a-pretext/> /GoGreen!

How to “read” the Russian reference to the missile shield

Of course, in what Moscow proposes here, Romania is included – we can read the anti-missile shield between the lines quite obviously. And not because the Americans would like to withdraw it – it is an American-Romanian project, but it has been assimilated and legitimized by NATO decisions. Let it be clear, it is a NATO project, it is not a bilateral agreement, as I heard from a party in Romania, that we kissed the ring of the Americans in 2013 (allusion to Călin Georgescu, honorary president of AUR – no. ).

Here the issue is very clear: Vladimir Putin does not want to discuss arms control with the Americans, but political issues. Political issues, Americans say, are discussed in NATO, not bilaterally. Because if it is discussed bilaterally, in practice, the North Atlantic Organization, in one form or another, falls into disuse.

### AT: Spill-Up

#### NO spill-up – YES trade-off – it’s a serious threat to NATO broadly

Donaghy 16 Aaron Donaghy, Visiting Scholar 2016-2017 & EU Marie Curie Global Fellow, Minda de Gunzburg Center for European Studies, “Panel 3: Europe’s Security and Foreign Policy Challenges,” Summit on the Future of Europe 2016, Europe and the Forces of Disunion, Executive Summary, 2016, <https://ces.fas.harvard.edu/uploads/files/Event-Papers/Summit-2016-Executive-Summary-Final.pdf> /GoGreen!

Rawi Abdelal, Herbert F. Johnson Professor of International Management at Harvard Business School and Director of Harvard’s Davis Center for Russian and Eurasian Studies, warned of the trend towards bilateralism at the expense of multilateralism. The ability of European institutions to multilateralize challenges was one of the foundations of its long history of success. Now, however, there is an increasing danger of the United States negotiating bilaterally rather than on collective terms (e.g. defense and trade arrangements), bypassing Brussels in the process. The spread of bilateralism is a growing threat to transatlantic security cooperation, particularly in lieu of recent Russian activities in what it sees as its sphere of influence. Abdelal points out, however, that Russia also has its weaknesses. Chief among them is its heavy dependence on the European market. He cites the example of Gazprom, the state-run gas company, whose supply of fuels to Europe provides Russia with roughly two-thirds of its government revenue.

#### Isolated instances of policy “uploading” does NOT equate to solvency at the level of the plan – “uploads” have been empirically superficial and strategically useless to NATO

Arts 21 Sophie Arts, senior program coordinator for security and defense policy, German Marshall Fund of the United States; and Steven Keil, fellow for security and defense policy and future of geopolitics, German Marshall Fund of the United States; “Flexible Security Arrangements and the Future of NATO Partnerships,” GMF Policy Paper, February 2021, <https://www.gmfus.org/sites/default/files/Arts%2520%2526%2520Keil%2520-%2520NATO%2520partnerships%2520formats.pdf> /GoGreen!

Despite this impressive list, NATO’s partnership mechanisms are not currently achieving their full potential and are due for a rethink. Many major issues are being neglected. This is not to say that partners no longer play a role in NATO’s operations and priorities. On the contrary, some—such as Sweden and Finland— are about as closely integrated in NATO’s planning as they could possibly be short of membership. But, as is also true with Georgia and Ukraine, most of these activities take place in bilateral or trilateral formats, although these countries are also part of other, larger partnership frameworks.

This reality reveals some flaws in NATO’s partnership policy. There are not only redundancies, but many of the broader frameworks have lost momentum and purpose. Many formats lack clear processes and goals, lumping together diverse groups of nations that have very different hopes and expectations in how they engage with NATO. In addition, formats like the Mediterranean Dialogue and the Istanbul Cooperation Initiative, which aim to catalyze broader cooperation beyond the traditional Euro-Atlantic area, continue to fall short of their intended purpose and lack a clear agenda for the future. While these frameworks demonstrate their usefulness by building political ties and space for dialogue, they are less effective when it comes to driving actual outcomes that benefit NATO’s interests or strategy, or those of its partner countries.

### AT: NB – Cohesion – 2AC

#### Net benefit’s backwards – perception alone tanks cohesion

Economist 3 “European defence: Divide and fall,” The Economist, 10-23-2003, <https://www.economist.com/news/leaders/2155692-recklessness-both-sides-atlantic-threatening-undermine-nato-divide-and-fall> /GoGreen!

Are Europe and America having doubts about their decades-long habits of common defence? America's ambassador to NATO darkly describes the current spat between NATO and the European Union (and for that matter within the EU itself), over what military things Europeans might plot to do together and where they might plot them, as “one of the greatest dangers to the transatlantic relationship”. France, Germany, Belgium and Luxembourg, who started the quarrel by announcing that the EU should build its own operational-planning headquarters in Tervuren, a previously inoffensive suburb of Brussels, claim that causing a rift in the alliance could not be further from their minds. But more is at stake than bricks and mortar. How the row is settled will affect the way Europe and America can work together in the future.

They have supposedly already agreed on many of the basics: that Europe's armies should boost their limited firepower, for example; and that the EU should be able to act independently of NATO in cases where the alliance, with right of first refusal, chooses not to be involved itself. Indeed a painstakingly worked-out formula, finalised in March, enables the EU to use NATO equipment for these sorts of military operations, as is already happening in the Lilliputian mission the Europeans have taken over from NATO in Macedonia. There is even general agreement that the EU should be able to plan for its own military operations.

The real disagreement is about how the Tervuren four want the EU to do that—in its own headquarters, entirely separate from NATO. And the Americans have been alarmed as much by the way the proposal came about as by its content: the four, all sceptics of the Iraq war, cooked it up at their own mini-summit in April, when tempers were still running high. Disparaged at the time as a “chocolate soldier” summit, given the limited military capabilities of its Belgian host, among others, the meeting nevertheless made the Americans worry that Europe's defence effort might start to evolve into a competitor to NATO, rather than as a complement to it. All the more so, as it fits President Jacques Chirac's recently expressed neo-Gaullist vision of a “multipolar” world, one in which Europe could potentially be as much America's rival as its ally.

Still more worrying, Britain's Tony Blair may have made concessions to the neo-Gaullists at a get-together with Mr Chirac and Germany's Gerhard Schröder last month. Perhaps to show goodwill in advance of the wrangling over the draft European Union constitution, perhaps to seem to distance himself a little from George Bush, Mr Blair was more hospitable than Britain had previously seemed to the notion of independent operational planning by the EU. He also appeared to agree that some EU members should be allowed to push ahead on defence without the rest, though he has been careful to insist that any advance party must be open to others to join. He is clear, too, that Europe's defence efforts must remain compatible with NATO's—and he has the support of a lot of other European governments in that. He has therefore ruled out setting up military shop in Tervuren. And he has so far shown no sign of giving way to those who want the new EU constitution to contain a mutual-defence clause, which could undermine NATO's status as the ultimate guarantor of Europe's security.

Friendly fire

Mr Blair is right. The EU can already plan its own military operations, whether using NATO kit (as in Macedonia), or that of France and Britain, its two most militarily capable nations. The EU's mission in Congo, for example, is being run from a French headquarters. Putting up a new building for such purposes, at Tervuren or anywhere else, makes no sense. If something more is needed, better—and safer—for the EU to do its operational planning at NATO's existing military headquarters at Mons, in Belgium. Both sets of planners will be calling on the same pool of soldiers, making co-ordination essential. And it is more soldiers, not more headquarters to order them about, that Europe needs. What is more, if an EU operation should ever go wrong, and NATO is called in to help, common procedures would put fewer soldiers' lives at risk.

The Americans, however, are also at fault. The Bush administration has itself recently seemed intent on dividing NATO into allies and irritants. This gives the impression that it prefers strong Europeans to a strong Europe. It wants well-armed countries with whom it can work bilaterally instead of turning first to NATO. What a pity if “friendly fire” were to fell what is still the most successful military alliance in history.

### AT: NB – Cohesion – 1AR

#### Even if bilateral provision is normal, their competition arg means they do NOT even bother consulting beforehand, which turns cohesion

Hopkinson 5 William Hopkinson, former visiting researcher at Stockholm International Peace Research Institute, read history at Pembroke College Cambridge, “The Atlantic Crises: Britain, Europe, and Parting from the United States,” Naval War College Newport Papers 23, May 2005, <https://apps.dtic.mil/sti/pdfs/ADA433848.pdf> /GoGreen!

Even immediately following the attacks, when for the first time in its history NATO invoked Article 5 of the Washington Treaty, its mutual defense commitment, the United States preferred to deal with its allies bilaterally rather than through the alliance. As regards the actual conduct of operations in Afghanistan, it is understandable that the United States did not use alliance machinery; however, that it did not use NATO as a forum for consultation over what it saw (and sees) as the principal security issue confronting itself and others, and the one through which it appears or purports to view most international affairs, raised major questions about the role of the alliance.

### Deficit – Multilat Key

#### Multilat key – mere perception that the law doesn’t explicitly authorize it is sufficient to wreck solvency

Thaler 16 David E. Thaler, Senior International/Defense Researcher at RAND, MIA International Security Policy/Middle East, Columbia University; Michael J. McNerney, Acting Director, International Security and Defense Policy Center, and Senior International/Defense Researcher, at RAND, Affiliate Faculty at Pardee RAND Graduate School, MA international relations, University of Maryland; Beth Grill, Senior Policy Analyst at RAND, MA Middle Eastern Studies and Economics, Johns Hopkins University School of Advanced International Studies; Jefferson P. Marquis, Adjunct Political Scientist at RAND, PhD U.S. diplomatic and military history, Ohio State University, MA international security affairs, Columbia University; and Amanda Kadlec, RAND; “From Patchwork to Framework: A Review of Title 10 Authorities for Security Cooperation,” RR1438, RAND Corporation, 2016, <https://www.rand.org/content/dam/rand/pubs/research_reports/RR1400/RR1438/RAND_RR1438.pdf> /GoGreen!

Three other limitations or gaps have been raised in numerous discussions with SC personnel in DoD. We indicated above that DoD has been limited in some authorities to working only with foreign forces associated with national defense agencies. Emerging transnational threats and mission areas require the ability to work with interior agency forces or other gendarme or civil authorities when their security forces retain primary responsibility for those mission areas or operate in close collaboration with MoDs. For example, in many cases, the ministry or department of interior is responsible for securing national infrastructure and cyber assets; of six countries CENTCOM officials are engaging on infrastructure security, only in Jordan is the military responsible for protecting the country’s infrastructure.66

A second gap in Title 10 authorities is in the flexibility for DoD to work with regional organizations rather than just bilaterally with national governments. Under Title 10, even regional programs (such as the Counterterrorism Partnership Fund [CTPF]) are implemented bilaterally with national governments. There are no mechanisms for training and equipping regional organizations.67 When this limitation is combined with the limitation on U.S. military engagement with non-MoD security forces, it inhibits the U.S. ability to facilitate coordination among agencies with similar responsibilities within and across partners to have regional effects and to address local security threats.68

Finally, while Section 1206 and the subsequent Section 2282 were designed to be a more rapid means of building partner capacity than traditional Title 22 authorities like FMF and FMS, even these programs take some 12-18 months to deliver equipment to partners. A number of SC stakeholders in DoD still perceive a need for more “timely assistance” to partners who require small amounts of support to recover or enhance existing capability of their “forces in the fight.”69 Currently, these stakeholders point out, a “pseudo-FMS” case for $10,000 in truck springs takes the same amount of time to process as a major item of equipment.70

Summary of DoD Perceptions of Title 10 SC Authorities

In sum, DoD has been able to achieve many of its SC objectives with the patchwork of Title 10 authorities, but the proliferation of authorities and the complexities they engender have rendered them exceedingly difficult to apply. As we have noted here and in previous research, authorities are not the only reason for the frustration expressed by SC personnel; internal processes, organizational relationships, programmatic requirements, and inadequate levels of funding have also created obstacles. But the existing catalog of Title 10 authorities in some ways drives or complicates these other factors when they present the challenges in planning and execution detailed above. What many in the DoD SC community perceive as a flawed legislative foundation has had a compounding impact on the administration and management of SC programs, systems, and processes.

#### Only NATO solves – superior legitimacy, crisis management, resourcing, political will, integration and socialization

Nunes 20 Isabel Ferreira Nunes, Head of the Research Centre and former Deputy Director of the National Defence Institute, Portugal, PhD Political Science, University of Twente, postdoc International Relations, University of Groningen, “Prospects for Euro-Atlantic Cooperation,” National Defence Institute, June 2020, <https://www.idn.gov.pt/pt/publicacoes/idncadernos/Documents/Texto%20integral/idncadernos_37.pdf> /GoGreen!

The development of this new European strategic approach reveals a constant tension between two political centres, within which engagement in collaborative crisis management can happen. That of Brussels, calling for further security and defence integration, while cooperating with NATO and that of capable and willing European member states interested in preserving their sovereignty and strategic autonomy. These developments towards what sometimes appears to generate conflicting courses of action, has produced a layered system where cooperation occurs in different configurations. These configurations coexist and sometimes compete with formal organizations such as the EU/CSDP and NATO and the cooperative framework that result from EU-NATO Joint Declarations of 2016 and 2018. This system of security governance is a three-layered system where multilateralism, minilateralism and strategic bilateralism coexist, allowing participants to accommodate goals, benefits and security practices that emanate at the EU and NATO level, with those driven by particular national interests.

Each serves a different collaborative purpose. Multilateralism20 in the framework of cooperative security arrangements comprehends a majority of participants in a given security regime21 for instance that of the UN, NATO or EU, leading to the development of formal and long-lasting cooperation and coordination among states and organizations. Conversely, minilateralism comprises a few like-minded and willing participants, with similar national interests and approaches to foreign and security policy, as well as identical operational output. Distinctive from multilateralism and minilateralism, “strategic bilateralism” (Renard 2016, p. 14) involves particular forms of selective engagement of strategically able and willing participants with self-interested motives in converging security views and policies, whether those are defence and security policies or security issue-based concerns such as terrorism, cyber or hybrid threats.

Being beyond the scope of this paper, these security configurations offers analytical space to empirical research allowing to test in which conditions, how this coexistence strengthens or conversely weakens cooperative security and how it impacts on EuroAtlantic security. The inclusion of a multilateralist focus in major political and strategic documents, such as the Treaty of Lisbon, the European Security Strategy (Council of the European Union 2003), the EU Global Strategy (High Representative 2016) and NATO Strategic Concept (North Atlantic Council 2010) is accompanied by references to a normative and ruled based multilateral stand, on which both the EU and NATO are founded and from which they draw legitimacy for their external action in crisis management and conflict resolution.

This constitutive base for common security and collective action has also been shaping the base for cooperative output between the two organizations, having the EU’s interpretation of multilateralism, a normative and regulative emphasis that binds individual to common interests and obligations, while promoting “issue-based engagements” (Council of the European Union 2019, § 8 and 9) preferred by Member States and partners. Since 2016, an officially assumed interest-based approach to security and defence can be identified in several EU documents, such as the EU Global Strategy, the European Commission statements on the launch of the European Defence Fund or in the process leading to the institutionalisation of a Directorate General for Defence. Such initiatives may also translate what seems to be a more strategic European approach to new concepts, such as resilience or ownership22, while “principled pragmatism” appears as the new guiding principle for common foreign, security and defence policy, to use the expression adopted by the EU Global Strategy itself.

In the EU context, this emerging security governance discourse and practice based on effective multilateralism seeks to help confirming the Union as a security provider. First, it legitimises and reiterates the international stand of the European Union through international law, on the base of values, but also of interests that constitute a given multilateral structure. Second, it informs a normative and regulative basis for internal and external relations of Member States by reducing the space between these two levels of security. Third, it sets a comprehensive platform of cooperative engagement to harmonize implementation of guidelines, to improve coordination and to enhance cooperation at different levels: the international, the regional and the local. Fourth, in those non-juridically binding policy domains or on those areas which fall outside the aquis communautaire, it offers the opportunity for willing compliance among Member States (Nunes 2018). Due to the EU institutional design, with multi-level decision making levels, complex formal decision-making structure and wide-ranging external relations, multilateralism offers a broader multi-layered and trans-sectoral scope for policy action. It comprehends diverse policy domains with security implications from crisis management to humanitarian and development aid, adding to security new themes such as cyberspace or climate change and making available different policy instruments, whether one refers to those of trade, foreign policy, security and more recently defence. The EU forms a regional order, within which the Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP) and CSDP constitute a security regime shared by Member States, where the EU leads various multilateral processes (Ujvari 2016, p. 2) from trade to development. In a European context, multilateralism also means a system of governance within which traditional actors such as the UN, NATO and African Union coexist with emergent actors like China or India or with decision-making frameworks23 such as the North Atlantic Council.

Multilateralism has been a cross cutting theme in the EU and NATO policy documents.24 Being suggested by some as hindering national interest, it is acknowledged by others as a prevailing governance system. This despite a tendency for bilateralization of policies, manifestation of preference for intergovernmental decision-making methods or regionalization of security and defence through minilateralism of security and defence initiatives, as explained further ahead. Multilateral platforms, such as NATO and the EU, favour jointness of action and harmonization of understandings on security. Despite the presence of other cooperative configurations, it is still a lasting method of cooperation in the euro-atlantic context for several reasons. First, it is likely to gain support for legitimacy reasons adding normative guidance and representativeness to security practice, due to the number of participants involved, serving both common and particular interests. In June 2019, the European Council Conclusions describes it as “the best way to advance national, as well as collective interests” (Council of the European Union 2019, § 2). Second, for reasons of self-regulation of security and defence relations among participants, predisposing them to self-restrain, as opposed to “more common unilateral and less restrained methods” (Jervis 1985, p. 59). Third, for facilitating ad hoc access to resources and security and defence goods, such as common or collective knowledge, expertise and capabilities.

The minilateralist configuration of security and defence cooperation is characterised by cooperative arrangements among like-minded countries, for instance in the EU case under the form of “Pooling & Sharing” initiatives or “Smart Defence” in the case of NATO, gathering strategically able countries. It may occur within the EU and NATO or outside them. Minilateralism means a “diplomatic process of a small group of interested parties working together to supplement or complement the activities of international organizations in tackling subjects deemed too complicated to be addressed appropriately at the multilateral level” (Moret 2016, p. 2). This means that being a more flexible configuration, than formal multilateral agreements, located within security and defence organizations, it may generate better adherence and compliance from interested participants. In the security and defence domain, minilateralism gathers politically willing, self-interested and militarily able actors in order to advance what Member States perceive to be more difficult to achieve within the binding framework of security and defence organizations. In the European context, minilateralist alternatives are not a novelty being envisaged (Nunes 2018, pp. 53-55) in the Lisbon Treaty through: the mechanism of “Enhanced Cooperation” (TEU Article 327) in the domain of the Union’s non-exclusive competences; through the 2017 Council Decision (Council Decision (CFSP), 2017/ 2315),which set forward a Permanent Structured Cooperation among willing and able Member States and through the provision of a “Framework Nation” concept, TEU Article 43 (1), through which the Union will retain political control and strategic direction, while entrusting “specific responsibilities” or tasks to a Member State in the context of a EU-led missions and operations.25 In operational terms, minilateralism translates into a process of aggregated and shared capabilities, as referred earlier in the context of “Pooling & Sharing” or NATO’s “Smart Defence”.

In NATO’s case, due to its issue specific nature, minilateralism is invoked in a different manner. It describes a configuration meant to address transnational military and non-military challenges from stabilisation operations to counter cyber and hybrid threats, often positioned at the upper end of defence tasks due to its operational demands. It can also adopt the format of coalitions of the willing26 where some, but not all, of the Alliance members engage in the pursuit of security and defence goals.27 In this case, it serves the purpose of a more rapid response to threats, with less formal legal boundaries and complex decision-making procedures derived from international law, as those mandatory to the United Nations and EU led-operations or from the constitutive norms of the Washington Treaty, to which the Alliance abides by when acting collectively.

Changes in the nature of security, the transnational consequences of insecurity and the growing selective interdependence of interests among security actors led to a renewed interest in minilateralism. Due to the fact it gathers a smaller number of participants, it is better able to promote convergence of security interests and approaches, to accelerate responses to crises and to improve force generation, thus reducing the impact of security dilemmas, as perceived by states and security communities (Nunes 2017a, p. 18). This is even more relevant in complex security contexts, where different interests and preferences prevail in the face of multiple security challenges and in times of scarce resources.

The “strategic bilateralism”28 although it may occur within multilateral structures, such as international organizations, it also evolves outside the intergovernmental structures of the EU crisis management setting and that of the Alliance’s collective defence. In these cases, international and regional institutions may offer what Renard notes (2016, p. 31) as the role of “framing and institutionalizing cooperation (…) and occasionally in complementing member States, rather than substituting for them”. More often this cooperative configuration denotes a will, as in the case of the United Kingdom, Germany, France, Canada and the United States to favour agreements at bilateral level that safeguard traditional foreign policy interests, outside and without the scrutiny of multilateral fora. Mattelaer (2019, p. 13) considers that the “prominence of bilateral diplomacy represents a symptom rather than a cause of change in the international system”. The revival of bilateral diplomacy can be observed in a wide variety of formats from the formality of the Lancaster House Treaty between Great Britain and France,29 following the ratification of the Lisbon Treaty a year earlier30 to the launch in June 2018 of the French led European Intervention Initiative31 or the Franco-Danish Defence Cooperation, known as the European Initiative2 (EI2)32 that followed the Council Decision of 2017, establishing the first EU Council Decision initiative on Permanent Structured Cooperation. The EI2 enabled Denmark to contribute to European security and defence, outside the PESCO arrangement.33 Lastly, the Achen Treaty on Franco-German Cooperation and Integration, signed on the 22 January 201934 through which the two countries agreed to “deepen their cooperation in matters of foreign policy, defence, external and internal security and development, while striving to strengthen Europe’s ability to act autonomously” (Aachen Treaty, 2019, Article 3). Although these initiatives have been agreed outside the European Union and NATO they aim at strengthening them, as referred in the preamble or provisions foresee in those declarations, while furthering the specific interests and preferences of contracting parts.

Being a common practice in international affairs, these three examples: the Lancaster House Treaty, the European Intervention Initiative35 and the Aachen Treaty36 occur in time, almost simultaneously to other initiatives agreed with the aim to deepen European security and defence cooperation, such as PESCO, CARD, the European Defence Fund and the setup of a DG Defence within the European Commission. This does not necessarily mean distrust by Member States on the political strength, binding nature or operational output of security and defence initiatives launched within the European Union. Strategic bilateralism supplement and is even “conducive to stronger multilateral cooperation” (Grevi 2012, p. 16). It may suggest that multilateral initiatives agreed in intergovernmental fora, only some of which legally binding like PESCO and with the regulative and financial weigh of the European Commission, such as the European Defence Fund, do not exclude the necessity of alternative cooperative configurations, capacities and operational output that multilateral institutions are unable, or unwilling, to deliver as a whole, for reasons of political interest, contextual opportunity and availability of military and non-military resources.

4. Contexts of Opportunity for EU-NATO Cooperation

The point of debate on capability gap still holds true, whether when comparing defence expenditures among the EU NATO member states in the Alliance context, Europe as a whole or between Europe and the United States.37

Twenty years later, the American political and very public discourse calling for greater strategic responsibility by European allies, coincided with the European Union’s claim for more strategic autonomy, following the presentation of the European Global Strategy, the launch of several European cooperative endeavours38 and the development of several bilateral security and defence initiatives, led by strategically strong EU member states.39

In 2016 the lack of formal endorsement of NATO’s collective defence by the President of the United States was aggravated by the doubts casted over the ability of European allies to allocate resources and commit to defence in the transatlantic context. This caused a perception of political, diplomatic and strategic “devaluation of the alliance”, in the sense attributed by Glen Snyder (1984, p. 467) and posed self-interested conditionalities to allies, beyond the 2% of defence spending target. Although, as Snyder (1984, p. 491) years earlier accurately assessed, the European allies should avoid the “risk of entrapment (consisting of) troop withdrawals, American downgrading of the priority of European defence in favour of other areas such as the Persian Gulf, or a further drift to unilateralism”40. These were exactly some of the decisions adopted and initiatives taken by President Trump, as from the earlier years of his presidency. In 2019, during the Munich Security Conference41 former Vice President Joseph Biden, and a potential running candidate for the Democratic Party in the 2020 Presidential election, did reiterate full support to NATO and to its allies conveying a firm belief in the principle of collective defence. This position was supported by the majority of the forty-five democratic senators in the United States Senate, by various senior military representatives at the Department of Defense, at the Pentagon and senior diplomats and officials in Brussels, proving different perceptions within the American political establishment. Despite the rhetoric, the US has been increasing its commitment to Europe’s eastern flank, as the account by the Department of Defense Budget on the European Deterrence Initiative demonstrates.42

It was in a political environment of mutual political distrust, rhetorical and diplomatic controversy, of strained relations between Washington and most European capitals, of fears of rising nationalism in France, the Netherlands, Germany, Poland, Hungary and the announced withdrawal of the United Kingdom from the EU, that a second attempt43 to formally enhance EU-NATO cooperation took place.

Despite the instability felt in Europe’s neighbourhood and the destabilizing effects caused by the consecutive interventions in Middle East, by the regime change in Libya and by the course of American and Russian foreign policy, the European and euroatlantic institutions proved resilient44 to contingencies sourced in the personality of national decision-makers and on the hindrances of party politics.

A realization that the EU-NATO cooperation was an imperative followed two major challenges to transatlantic unity. On the one hand, the coalition force that intervene in Kosovo (North Atlantic Council 1999a and 1999b) with NATO, despite the absence of a United Nations mandate. On the other, the American intervention in Afghanistan, at a time when the United States declined to accept the possibility to invoke Article 5, in reaction to the terrorist attacks of 11 September 200145.

The 2003 EU-NATO Declaration46 paved the way to the so-called development of a “strategic partnership” (Renard 2016b) between the EU and NATO. This led to the Berlin Plus agreement, opening the opportunity to the European Union to use NATO’s command and control collective structure and to institutionalise forms of cooperation and political consultation between the two organizations in the field of crisis management and capability development on fight against terrorism, organized crime and cybersecurity.

In 2016, the need to foster better EU and NATO cooperation was in part a reaction to two exogenous events. On the one hand, the potential wearing down of transatlantic relations in the face of growing defence spending, following the unilateral involvement of some allied countries in the Syrian conflict and in military operations in the context of fight against ISIS. On the other, due to a continuous ambivalence in relations between the United States, the EU and NATO sourced in the political and strategic narrative of American administrations against the development of European defence integration. The notion of European Security and Defence Identity or that of a NATO’s European pillar47 prevailed over a more autonomous European defence, while the very same administrations pressed for a more independent operational output of European allies, higher defence spending and stronger commitment of Europeans to NATO’s military operations.

Despite the potential for disagreement between the two organizations, contextual events did prove their adaptability to the changing strategic environment. NATO evolved from out-of-area to a new military stance with the return to European and transatlantic core defence functions, after the interventions in Afghanistan and Iraq. The EU/CSDP, although without abandoning its security interests towards the near neighbourhood, turned its security focus to the protection of its citizens, to a more efficient response to external crises and called for better commitment towards regional security and capacity building of partners, leading to stronger resilience and committed ownership.48 These almost simultaneous processes of adaptation were accompanied by a closer relation among allies, centred on the principle of “effective multilateralism” and strategic complementarity, contradicting the idea of competition and duplication between the two organizations. This is a reserve frequently expressed among policy makers and analysts, although it has been formally addressed and solved within both organizations.

From an early stage, EU actors have denied the idea of competing or duplicating security and defence projects by stating that CSDP will act “where NATO as a whole is not or does not wish to get involved”, a concern repeatedly underlined since the 2001 Laeken EU Council and reiterated in the Lisbon Treaty (Treaty of Lisbon 2007). More recently a statement adopted by the European Defence Agency assured that “no capacity duplication with other institutions such as NATO” would happen, stressing that PESCO would develop as a “coherent full spectrum force package” (EDA 2018, p. 4) in complementarity with NATO. This intention was also reiterated by the “Implementation Plan for Security and Defence”, by the “European Defence Action Plan” and by the “Notification letter on PESCO to the Council and High Representative”. This concern with avoiding the idea of duplication is also mirrored at the bilateral level among those which are strategically more capable. Recent agreements between actors such as France and Germany, as in the case of the Achen Treaty in its Article 4, emphasises that the bilateral commitment to reinforce cooperation between France and Germany, regarding European security and defence is taken “In light of their obligations under Article 5 of the North Atlantic Treaty of 4 April 1949 and of Article 42 (7) of the Treaty on European Union of 7 February 1992, as amended by the Treaty of Lisbon of 13 December 2007 amending the Treaty on European Union” (Achen Treaty, 2019, Article 4 (1)) formally refuting any interpretations on duplication.

In July 2016, in Warsaw, the President of the European Council, the President of the European Commission and NATO’s Secretary General signed an EU-NATO Joint Declaration on how to further cooperation between the two organizations. This initiative was followed in December, of the same year, by an agreement on a common set of proposals to implement “EU-NATO Joint Declaration” (2016) by endorsing 42 proposals in the 7 areas agreed: defence capabilities; capacity building; industry and research; cyber security; hybrid threats, operational cooperation and exercises. NATO Secretary General Jens Stoltenberg called the 2016 agreement “a milestone in our relations,” recognising that “neither organisation has the full range of tools” to address new security and defence challenges unilaterally (NATO Meeting Ministers of Foreign Affairs 2016).

In December 2017 the Council of the European Union49 would underline the necessity to implement the Joint Declaration reinforcing cooperation at the strategic and operational levels between the EU and NATO. A particular interest was placed on the collaboration between the European Centre of Excellence for Countering Hybrid Threats¸ staff level cooperation on threat assessment regarding terrorism and on how to counter terrorist threats. The identification of gender indicators and assessments on how they could improve situational awareness, in support of the UNSCR 1325 agreed in 2000, were also addressed. It was agreed to promote EU and NATO staff presence in advisory and preparedness bodies for missions of the respective organizations and better coordination of EU-NATO exercises.

In 2018 a EU-NATO Joint Declaration was signed reiterating the interest and noting the progress achieved on what regards military mobility, counter-terrorism, cyber security, hybrid threats, resilience to chemical, biological, radiological and nuclear related risks and promoting the women, peace and security agenda. This was followed by the attendance of the new High Representative Josep Borrell to NATO Defence Ministerial meeting. At the operational level there is a continuous cooperative effort in the Aegean Sea, where NATO has six ships helping to implement the agreement between the EU and Turkey on the refugee crisis, as well as support to Operation Sophia in the Mediterranean.50 This measures and actions reflect the particular security and defence concerns of both organizations and how NATO and the EU may contribute to mitigate them. Coherence, complementarity and interoperability remain the three main drivers for EU-NATO cooperation and the only acceptable and feasible in times of limited budgets and increasing new challenges to security and defence.

However, the cumulative nature of the process of cooperation that result from the EU-NATO Joint Declarations cooperation, rather than phased and incremental, may be counterproductive for three reasons. First, for reasons of capacity availability and funding. Second due to the length of national legislative cycles, which may limit the political willingness of Member States to pursue, in a sustainable manner, new cooperative engagements once the political cycle has changed. Third, and as Verbeke notes (2017, p. 5), structural projects such as those related with states “Long term strategic interests or investments (such as energy infrastructure or major defence platforms) are neglected in favour of short-term tactical advantages or pet projects”. This trend may compromise the binding effect of more structural commitments, agreed within multilateral arrangements, such as NATO and the EU.

Each Member State encloses very specific political, strategic, diplomatic and security cultures, distinct historical legacies and operational output. This may be determinant on how security and defence cooperation moves forward and how Member States and participant states accommodate alternative frameworks in multilateral, minilateral and bilateral settings, adjusting to new processes of security governance. Connected societies are as prone to accountability as they are to the immediacy of results, a demand that fits poorly to the required long-term test to which regional and international cooperation is exposed to, in order to prove resilience to external challenges and efficient output in the face of change.

5. Advantages of EU-NATO Cooperation

Despite considerable improvements leading to better institutionalization of cooperation, between the EU and NATO, academic and policy debates are still focused on traditional divides, which can be systematized in two approaches: on how to address and manage security problems. Those that, in the words of Glenn Snyder (1984:489), postulate the effectiveness of “toughness and confrontation” and those who value a “strategy of conciliation”. This divide has been characterising the cooperative stance between the two organizations for decades and those of Member States foreign relations. To a certain extent, this dichotomy affects both the analytical and strategic approach, when addressing Euro-Atlantic security and defence relations. This varies from a persistent concern with the division of strategic work among European and non-European allies (Yost, 2000 and 2007); to the problem of strategic and financial burden sharing (Kivimäki 2019; Jakobsen 2018; National Defence Strategy 2018) and to the conditionality that results in the fact European defence will only be welcomed by the United States and by the more Atlanticist allies, if and when it strengthens NATO (Brattberg 2018; BillonGalland and Thomson 2018; Leonard and Shapiro 2019). The specific concern with division of strategic work in a NATO context and the reluctance of some Member States to embrace role specialisation of certain security and defence tasks at the European level, has evolved into a new perception on the disagreements registered among allies on the Alliance collective share of risks and defence expenses versus selective common investments in European security and defence, through Permanent Structured Cooperation. The two moments of strategic strain in 2003 and 2016, did not impair Euro-Atlantic cooperation and despite concerns with duplication and competition, developments have shown that complementarity between the two organizations is valued the most.51

Several circumstances have been enabling better opportunities for cooperation between the EU and NATO. First, contextual related reasons such as the emergence of hybrid threats in the Eastern Europe, the threat of potential and actual external interferences on allied countries internal affairs, the consequences of the refugee crisis over European unity and the uncertainties caused by the British referendum.52 To this already long list, one must add the internal and regional consequences of the conflict in Syria, the position of President Donald Trump regarding NATO and the EU creating a perception of existential threat the long and well succeed transatlantic alliance. On the one hand, it led to the claim that Europe should aim at a stronger role in the security and defence of Europe. On the other, that that strengthened position would only be supported if and when it reinforced NATO. In the face of current security challenges, unforeseeable outcomes of insecurity, limited resources and greater interdependency related with the consequences of uncertainty, the development of cooperation, rather than competition, is an expected outcome for relations among states and within international organizations. The deterioration of insecurity in North Africa, following the collapse of Muammar al-Gaddafi’s regime in Libya, the downfall of the so called Islamic state in the Middle East, the consequences of revisionist foreign policies and the spread of terrorist acts in Europe point to the diversity of sources of insecurity and to the necessity for a more efficient and distinct form of security and defence cooperation53, of which military cooperation is just a part. Closer functional cooperation between the EU and NATO may help to better deal with the uncertainties of systemic insecurity in Eastern Europe and on the South and South-eastern rim of the Mediterranean, offering the opportunity to safeguard distinct national and international security interests. Decision makers and international bureaucracies should endorse what Member States do better, whether that is crisis response or conflict management, fight against terrorism, maritime security and mitigation of cyber and hybrid threats, according to different strategic cultures and interests, while fostering ownership and cooperation in response to security challenges.

Second, collaborative practice strives better in institutional environments where international socialization among security and defence actors is high. In strongly connected structures political, public scrutiny may turn collaborative practice into an instrument that adds legitimacy, better mobilizes public and political will and creates more favourable conditions to resource security and defence agencies, such as NATO and the EU-CSDP. NATO and the EU gather relevant strategic players, share a high degree of membership overlap and their international security mandates have a specific focus on European security and defence interests. This brings into Euro-Atlantic collaborative practice both an element of representativeness of interests and a dimension of legitimacy.

Third, power shifts in the international system may lead to changes in the nature of security, opening up a new range of tasks for international organizations beyond their original mandate, from military missions to operations-other-than-war, to humanitarian relief, organized crime eradication and disaster relief. This is reflected in new security tasks, but also in new mobilizing arguments in the way security roles are performed, such as preventive security, pre-emptive military action, mitigation of hybrid threats and crisis response, rather than classical military offensive, an option that governments and public opinions appear to be less inclined to support. New role prescriptions not only demand new military and non-military responses, but also a security discourse that appeals to cooperative action, combining international law, centred on value-based principles and arguments that serve national interests, while suggesting further functional integration on security and defence. Role specialisation may be an “asset” on demand given that not all armed and security forces can afford to have the full spectrum of capabilities required to mitigate current challenges and threats.

The institutionalisation of new forms of cooperative security, as established between the EU-NATO, by the corresponding declarations on cooperation of 2003, 2016 and 2018, underline the need to share risks and responsibilities in specific security levels, notably in the context of hybrid threats, maritime security to mitigate illegal trafficking of human beings and search and rescue of irregular migrants at sea. A good example of EU-NATO cooperation at the operational level was developed in the Horn of Africa to counter maritime piracy54, together with missions in land with the aim to develop capacity building on maritime security, in coastal areas in the region. Other cooperative efforts were developed in 2016, through Operation Sophia, with the aim to lessen the challenges posed by the refugee crisis in the Aegean Sea, in combination with the support given to the Turkish and Greek authorities and the support made available by EU FRONTEX. In each of these missions and operations, both NATO and the EU moved from traditional security and defence in the far border, to counter-piracy and irregular migration in the near border.

The fourth advantage of enhancing security and defence cooperation between the EU and NATO results from the fact that, organizations and the states that incorporate them commit to cooperative frameworks for reasons of easier access to specialized knowledge, information and resources. Currently, the EU as already access to command and planning structures of NATO, under the Berlin Plus agreement and in the future it can be envisaged an eventual access of NATO to the EU-CSDP specific civilian proficiencies of the European crisis response toolkit. The development of both the EU CSDP Civilian Compact (Council of the European Union 2018) and the projects developed under Permanent Structured Cooperation (Council Decision 2017) may contribute to develop European actors roles, knowledge and experience on civilian crisis management, while supplementing the amount of resources needed among participant states in crisis prevention, conflict resolution and in post-conflict situations.

For cooperation to happen political will and trust must be present. These conditions are not mere technical arrangements, sometimes not even financial ones, they are a choice that shapes the opportunity to engage collective. The participation in new cooperative security frameworks in “conditions of confidence building, transparency, information availability and knowledge” (Nunes 2006, p. 89), enable institutional mimetism to strive among organizations, thus facilitating cooperation or conversely creating a situation of perceived competition for mandates and resources. In the case of NATO, there is a growing appeal among allies for it to perform civilian security tasks for which the Alliance was not originally created, as a political and military organization. In the case of EU-CSDP, one observes an increasing institutionalization of conditions aiming at a better operational deliver, following the approval of a Security and Defence Action Plan (European Council 2016) and the agreement on Permanent Structured Cooperation.55

Lastly, the fact both NATO and the EU are politically integrated and highly socialised organizations, bound by similar norms and interests, makes political cooperation an opportunity and the prospect of more efficient operational collective engagement more likely. Cooperation is expected to work better in an interdependent security environment, where multiple memberships to organizations are present and where resources scarcity or uneven distribution of resources occurs turning cooperation into a more advantageous and less costly alternative.

### Deficit – Norm-Setting

#### Counterplan forfeits NATO’s norm-setting power

Arts 21 Sophie Arts, senior program coordinator for security and defense policy, German Marshall Fund of the United States; and Steven Keil, fellow for security and defense policy and future of geopolitics, German Marshall Fund of the United States; “Flexible Security Arrangements and the Future of NATO Partnerships,” GMF Policy Paper, February 2021, <https://www.gmfus.org/sites/default/files/Arts%2520%2526%2520Keil%2520-%2520NATO%2520partnerships%2520formats.pdf> /GoGreen!

But ad hoc approaches also pose challenges to organizations like NATO. Madeleine Albright warned against the “three Ds” in the 1990s when she highlighted the risks of de-linking from, or duplicating NATO efforts, as well as discriminating among members.24 These issues remain an important concern—particularly in U.S. policy discussions – when it comes to more recent ad hoc or minilateral formats focused on European defense. A more concerted NATO role in guiding flexible efforts within the alliance could help address this concern to minimize redundancies and buttress cohesion.

NATO should work as much as possible with members and partners to ensure minilateral formats complement, rather than compete with, the alliance. Moreover, NATO should consider how it can more effectively apply the lessons of these formats to its partnership policy to craft a more flexible approach. This includes lessons from previous efforts to create flexible formats within the alliance.

There are few metrics to evaluate a model’s success. In many ways, weighing the differences between minilateral arrangements outside larger multilateral frameworks and flexible formats inside them is tantamount to comparing apples and oranges. But there are a few factors that are instructive, including mutual interest in cooperation, shared threat perceptions and security priorities (which are often aligned with geographic location), and a high level of ambition of all involved participants. Moreover, on a procedural level, clear, defined goals and a focus on outputs, coupled with regular consultations, can help drive success. Ad hoc formats with lean and focused structures that are built around voluntary participation allow for quicker responses—especially in crisis situations—but they may be less suited to driving and verifying success on long term deliverables and capability goals.

Flexible formats embedded within NATO, like the FNC and the NATO+N model, or alongside NATO in the case of PESCO can increase agility for member and partner cooperation. But the diminishing enthusiasm around the German FNC and challenges surrounding PESCO funding indicate continued hurdles. The NATO+N model has proven effective in engaging two or three partners around common regional security challenges (for example, NATO members, Finland, and Sweden). Yet, its limits risk a default bilateralization or trilateralization of NATO’s engagement with partners and may fail to leverage a broader capacity of partnerships.

In its effort to create greater political cohesion in Euro-Atlantic defense, NATO cannot ignore the application and improvement of its flexible partnership engagement. The tendency of NATO members and partners to participate in various minilateral formats has significant implications. If NATO cannot figure out how to engage partners more effectively and flexibly, they and members may increasingly be inclined to engage in various minilateral formats rather than NATO or simply pursue bilateral ties. In this context, NATO partnerships could end up as little more than a “talk shop,” forfeiting the alliance’s agenda-setting power.

### Deficit – Political Sustainability

#### Counterplan tanks public support for NATO – key to sustain U.S. membership

Skidmore 12 David Skidmore, Drake University, “The Obama Presidency and US Foreign Policy: Where’s the Multilateralism?” International Studies Perspectives, no.13, 2012, pp.43-64, DOI 10.1111/j.1528-3585.2011.00454.x /GoGreen!

Policymakers tend to assume that foreign aid can attract public support only to the extent that it is perceived to serve narrowly focused national interests. Yet, the 1995 survey found that humanitarian rationales for aid attracted the strongest support. Americans were less inclined to favor aid programs designed to reward friendly countries or to win economic benefits for US business. Military aid was also quite unpopular. But majorities ranging from 74% to 91% wanted to maintain or increase aid devoted to ends such as child survival, humanitarian relief, repairing the environment, family planning, and long-term economic development. There existed strong support for targeting aid toward the poorest countries. Americans were skeptical, however, that aid actually reaches those who need it or achieves humanitarian aims. Roughly 80% of respondents believed that too much aid went to undemocratic regimes, that aid is plagued by waste and corruption, and that foreign assistance programs often foster dependence on the part of recipients.11

One obvious implication of these findings is that advocates for increased foreign aid would do well to correct public misperceptions that the United States is bearing a disproportionate burden as compared with other aid-giving countries. Yet, research conducted by the Aspen Institute suggests that the problem is more complicated: ‘‘When informants were confronted with such information, they showed momentary surprise, and then reverted to their old patterns of reasoning. A core rule of strategic frame analysis is at play here: if the facts don’t fit the frame, it is the facts that are rejected, not the frame’’ (Bales 2001:8).

A better strategy for mobilizing public support for aid is to emphasize America’s shared responsibility to respond to human suffering in concert with others. This approach shifts the focus from interests to values and assures members of the public that the burden is not borne by the United States alone. Funneling increasing proportions of US aid through bilateral rather than multilateral mechanisms actually undercuts the appeal of aid by reinforcing erroneous perceptions that America is on its own when it comes to fighting hunger, disease, and natural disasters. Placing aid within a multilateral context, by contrast, highlights the contributions of other states. A 2010 Chicago Council on Global Affairs survey found that only 8% supported the view that the United States should continue to serve as the pre-eminent leader in responding to international problems. On the other hand, only 19% felt that the United States should withdraw from efforts to solve most international problems. Instead, a large majority—71%—adopted the view that the United States should do its share in cooperation with other countries.

More generally, public support for multilateral engagement rises when the domestic audience is primed through exposure to cooperative frames. Framing involves the use of metaphors, analogies, and symbols that serve to cue up desired associations among audience members with respect to a given issue. Research conducted by the Aspen Institute has found that, in comparisons with a control group, respondent attitudes toward multilateral engagement abroad shifted in a positive direction when previously exposed to statements stressing interdependence, partnership, and shared norms among states and societies. This research also suggested that policymakers must convince members of the public that global problems are not intractable but instead amenable to feasible solutions.

Despite recent survey results pointing to declining support for international engagement, the challenge for policymakers who seek to overcome domestic obstacles to international engagement is less to expand the breadth of public support for such initiatives than to deepen the salience of multilateralism among members of the public. Passive and shallow majorities in favor of international cooperation do little to counter the influence of mobilized interests who oppose multilateral engagement or to overcome misperceptions among politicians who mistakenly read the public as unilateralist. A president seeking domestic support for a multilateral agenda in US foreign policy must therefore craft a compelling narrative that serves to awaken and mobilize the latent public support that has to date remained dormant and underutilized.

### T/N – Miscalc

#### Counterplan’s signal of subregional fragmentation causes miscalc – escalates to global war

Richter 17 Wolfgang Richter, (Colonel ret.) Fellow at the German Institute for International and Security Affairs in Berlin, Research Group on Security Politics, “Return to Security Cooperation in Europe: The Stabilizing Role of Conventional Arms Control,” Deep Cuts Working Paper No.11, September 2017, <https://deepcuts.org/images/PDF/DeepCuts_WP11_Richter.pdf> /GoGreen!

No matter how one might assess sub-regional force balances, the assumption that an aggression against a NATO ally could be limited to a sub-regional war seems flawed. Nevertheless, a narrow focus on sub-regional Russian geographical advantages as to quick movements of land forces has been shaping the western discussion on military response options.

But launching a deliberate major aggression against an alliance that disposes at superior conventional forces and positive security guarantees by nuclear powers would entail incalculable risks of a global war. This is not a plausible scenario.

This is why the German government and western European allies during the Warsaw NATO Summit7 in July 2016 insisted that the purpose of an enhanced forward presence is a limited one: It aims at sending a strategic signal that the alliance cannot be divided rather than trying to engage in an arms race to win sub-regional military superiority. Consequently, they rejected requests to station several heavy brigades and to build-up new military frontlines in contradiction to the restraint commitment enshrined in the NATO-Russia Founding Act of 1997.8

The true core of the issue is that changing force postures and military doctrines, forward deployment of new units and the increase of military activities such as large scale manoeuvres, snap exercises without prior notification and near border reconnaissance flights are a matter of great concern, especially if accompanied by dangerous brinkmanship which can spin out of control. This concern is all the more relevant since a sense of a new confrontation is dominating political discourses in East and West and the narratives on the root causes of conflict have developed in opposite and incompatible directions.

#### It’s the nightmare scenario

Hyde-Price 12 Adrian Hyde-Price, Professor of International Politics at the University of Bath, “The Future of the European Security System,” Studia Diplomatica, 65(1), 2012, pp.127-139, JSTOR /GoGreen!

The final scenario envisages a more organic and fluid European security system, evolving without the conscious architectural design of the first three models, and taking shape through a process of mutual give and take. It is a model of a Europe of independent nation-states, defending their national interests but cooperating together for mutual benefit, without attempting to create a hierarchical security architecture or overarching multilateral governance. In this scenario, European security would involve shifting patterns of bilateral, minilateral and multilateral cooperation, with ad hoc groupings (‘coalitions of the willing’) forming to deal with specific problems, and a ‘variable geometry’ of security cooperation developing across the continent. This is a vision of Europe that lacks many committed advocates; indeed, it is one which is widely viewed as the nightmare scenario, involving a ‘renationalisation’ of security policy, multipolar instability, and a situation in which – in Thucydides words – the strong do what they will, and the weak do what they must.